Pesach 5771

    Pesach is unique among the Jewish holidays in many ways. One of its unique aspects is its structure. Although Succos is also seven days (Vayikra 23:34), only the first of those days is Yom Tov (two days outside Israel), with restrictions similar to Shabbos. There is a separate “eighth day” when those restrictions also apply, but Succos itself is only seven days. Pesach, on the other hand, is the only Yom Tov that lasts seven days and has “intermediary days” that are book-ended  by full days of Yom Tov.

    The seventh day of Pesach corresponds to “K’riyas Yam Suf,” when G-d split the sea, allowing us to walk through on “dry land”(Shemos 14:22) before bringing the sea back to normal and drowning the Egyptians in it (see Rashi on 14:5). Although the focus of Pesach is our leaving Egypt on the 15th of Nisan (the first night and day of Pesach), telling over the harshness of our servitude in Egypt and all the miracles G-d did to free us from it, the exodus was not complete until we went through the sea and the Egyptians drowned in it. Pharaoh had never been asked to let the Children of Israel leave Egypt forever, only that they leave for a “three day journey” to worship G-d in the desert (see http://aishdas.org/ta/5766/beshalach.pdf ). The plagues could have been sent to punish Pharaoh for refusing to do this, and/or to make him change his mind; there was no way to know at the time that they were designed to give the Children of Israel full freedom (see page 3 of http://aishdas.org/ta/5765/beshalach.pdf ). It was only after the miraculous splitting of the sea that it became evident that G-d wanted to take them out of Egypt completely; our exodus was not complete until the seventh day of Pesach, warranting it being a full day of Yom Tov.

    As I discussed in the pieces referenced above, whether G-d would take the Children of Israel out of Egypt at that point, 210 years after “Israel” (Yaakov) moved to Egypt (actually 209, since the 210 years started a year earlier, when his sons went down to Egypt to buy grain), depended on whether the 400 year exile “in a land not theirs” (Beriashis 15:13) had started from the birth of Yitzchok (see Rashi). I would like to add another aspect to this discussion, based on a piece Rabbi Avrom Shain, sh’lita wrote on the Hagada (Nachalas Ish, printed in the back of Birkas Ish) that discusses why the “chiefs of Edom became disoriented” (Shemos 15:15) after the splitting of the sea.

    After Avraham had returned from Egypt (Beraishis 13:7), there was a dispute between his shepherds and Lot’s shepherds. The basis for this dispute was whether the land promised to Avraham was already his, and their cattle could graze anywhere, or they could only graze on land that was ownerless because it didn‘t belong to him yet (see Rashi). This dispute was also relevant to when the 400 year exile started. If the land already belonged to Avraham, then he (and his son Yitzchok) were not in a land that “wasn’t theirs,” and these years couldn’t be considered part of the 400 years of exile. Avraham never treated the land as if it were his, never grazing on anyone else’s property and paying full price to buy the cave within which his wife was buried.

    When Avraham died without ever treating the land as his own, it became apparent that he never benefited from the promise to receive the land. Yet, the Torah says that it was given to our forefathers (Avraham, Yitzchok and Yaakov) themselves, not just to their descendants (Devarim 11:21). This is one of the indications that the dead will be resurrected (“t‘chiyas ha‘maisim“), as otherwise they would never be able to personally own it. The Talmud (Bava Basra 16b) says that one of the sins Eisav committed on the day Avraham died was denying that the dead would be resurrected. The Midrash (Beraishis Rabbah 63:11) only mentions this sin, connecting it with his denial that there is any reward for doing mitzvos. Although there is an obvious connection between being rewarded for following G-d’s will and being resurrected to properly receive that reward, I think the Midrash is highlighting what led Eisav to this denial.

    It is obvious that Eisav believed in G-d, and that G-d is the ultimate source of everything, from the level of disappointment he felt when he found out that the blessings for material wealth he so craved were given to Yaakov instead. The concept of reward and punishment is not only relevant if we have free will, and are therefore responsible for the choices we make. They are also a powerful tool to help shape future behavior, both as an incentive to do the “right” thing (and not do what’s “wrong”), and as an educational tool to teach what’s “right” and what’s “wrong.” However, reward and punishment given after the soul leaves the body only makes sense if the person was responsible for his actions (and inactions). If there was no real choice in what is done (or not done), and there is no longer any chance to change or means to be educated (or educate others), there is nothing to be rewarded (or punished) for. [That doesn’t mean every decision we make is done by exercising “free will.” Throughout his writings (or where he is quoted/paraphrased), Rav Eliyahu Dessler, z”l, makes it clear that “bechira chofshis” (free will) only applies when we would consider choosing more than one thing; we have the ability to choose more than one option; and we recognize that the options available have elements of “truth” and “falsehood” (or “right” and “wrong”) and are not just a personal preference. Even if most decisions made by most people are not done via “free will,” if there was no concept of “free will” at all, a just G-d could not reward or punish any of His creations for what they chose.]

    If Eisav wouldn’t take responsibility for his actions, thinking that it was just his nature (and he had no real choice in the matter), then any “reward” his grandfather Avraham was promised for doing “good” had to be received in this world. When Avraham died without receiving this “reward,” Eisav was faced with two options. He could either change his worldview and realize that we do have “free will,” so the promise to Avraham could be fulfilled after he comes back to life, or maintain his denial of personal responsibility, and deny the concepts of “reward and punishment” and “t’chiyas ha’meisim,” by insisting that Avraham really got his “reward” of the Promised Land, even if he chose not to “use” his reward. After all, a gift belongs to the person it was given to even if it is put in a closet and never used; Avraham never benefiting from his “gift” doesn’t mean it was never given to him. Chazal are teaching us that Eisav chose (yes, chose, because he did have free will) to continue refusing to accept responsibility for his choices, and therefore maintained that Avraham must have already received the land promised to him, thereby denying the concept of reward and punishment and of “t’chiyas ha’maisem.”

    If Avraham had received his “reward” while he was alive, the 400 year exile couldn’t have started while he (and his sons) were still living in Canaan, as they were in a land that “was theirs.” The plagues must have been sent because Pharaoh disobeyed G-d‘s request to let His nation go on a spiritual retreat, not because G-d wanted them to be free. However, after the splitting of the sea, when it became apparent that G-d took the Children of Israel out of Egypt, it also became apparent that the 400 years had ended, and therefore that the land hadn’t yet been given to Avraham. Upon hearing this, the “chiefs of Edom became disoriented,” because their whole world view (that they cannot be held accountable for their actions because there is no free will) was being challenged. (It is possible that Lot’s descendants maintained the same philosophy, as it would not only absolve them of any responsibility for their actions, but absolve the actions of their forefather and foremothers as well. This could explain why “the powerful ones of Moav were gripped with trembling,” and not included with the “withering [spirit] of those who dwelled in Canaan,” who were concerned about their land being conquered.)

    Although we don’t say a “she’he’cheyanu” on the seventh day of Pesach (unlike Sh’mini Atzeres, which is not considered “Succos” and is therefore a new Yom Tov), because it corresponds to the splitting of the sea, which proved that the Promised Land had not yet been given to Avraham and that he would be given an opportunity to live there after it was “his,” there is still something “new” gleaned from what happened on the seventh day of Pesach–the concept of “t’chiyas ha’meisim.”